Collective Action Problem

Collective action refers to group action whenever two or more individuals are involved. A basic hypothesis is that “…the incentive system may be regarded as the principal variable affecting organizational behavior” (Clark and Wilson 1961, p. 130). Concerning incentive system and rational choice, we know from Mancur Olson’s seminal work The Logic of Collective Action (1965) that it does not pay an individual to provide collective goods for a group voluntarily if the individual economic gain from doing this is negative. Olson (1965) introduced the collective action problem and the free-rider concept as we know it today. Before that, groups were simply viewed as voluntary organizations. They were assumed to organize and promote their group interests almost automatically (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). This is, however, not the case due to the collective action problem according to Olson, and this is his main contribution to social science. It does not pay an individual in larger groups to act as the entrepreneur and facilitate local collective action because individual costs from doing so are typically higher than the individual benefits from acting. Nevertheless, everyday observations and empirical evidence tell us that larger groups do organize and that entrepreneurs in the form of group leaders do exist, so social incentives may play a role too in the rational choice approach.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Similar content being viewed by others

Collective Action Problem

Catholic Church, The

Collective action: fifty years later

References

• Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (1998). Basic interests: The importance of groups in politics and in political science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. BookGoogle Scholar
• Bjørnskov, C., & Svendsen, G. T. (2013). Does social trust determine the size of the welfare state? Evidence using historical identification. Public Choice, 157, 269–286. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Brandt, G. T., & Svendsen, G. T. (2016). When can a green entrepreneur manage the local environment? Journal of Environmental Management, 183(3), 622–629. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Clark, P. B., & Wilson, J. Q. (1961). Incentive systems: A theory of organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 6(2), 129–166. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Gundlach, E., & Svendsen, G. T. (2019). How do high and low levels of social trust affect the long-run performance of poor economies? Journal of International Development, 31(1), 3–21. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Hillman, A. L. (2019). Public finance and public policy: A political economy perspective on the responsibilities and limitations of government. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. BookGoogle Scholar
• Hume, D. (1984 [1739]). A treatise of human nature. New York: Penguin Books. Google Scholar
• Jensen, C., & Svendsen, G. T. (2011). Giving money to strangers. European welfare states and social trust. International Journal of Social Welfare, 20, 3–9. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Kelman, S. (1987). Public choice and public spirit. The Public Interest, 87, 80–94. Google Scholar
• Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. BookGoogle Scholar
• Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
• Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Google Scholar
• Ostrom, E. (1965). Public entrepreneurship: A case study in ground water basin management. PhD dissertation. Los Angeles: Department of Political Science, University of California. Google Scholar
• Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action, the political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. BookGoogle Scholar
• Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address. The American Political Science Review, 1, 1–22. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Ostrom, E., & Ahn, T. K. (2009). The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action. In G. T. Svendsen & G. L. H. Svendsen (Eds.), Handbook of social capital. The troika of sociology, political science and economics (1st ed., pp. 17–35). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Google Scholar
• Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone – The collapse and revival of American community (1st ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Google Scholar
• Rothstein, B. (2009). The universal welfare state. In G. T. Svendsen & G. L. H. Svendsen (Eds.), Handbook of social capital. The troika of sociology, political science and economics (pp. 212–227). Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Google Scholar
• Salisbury, R. H. (1969). An exchange theory of interest groups. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13, 1–32. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Smith, A. ([1766] 1997). Lecture on the influence of commerce on manners. In D. B. Klein (Ed.), Reputation: Studies in the voluntary elicitation of good conduct (pp. 17–20). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Google Scholar
• Svendsen, G. T., & Svendsen, G. L. H. (2016). Trust, social capital and the Scandinavian welfare state: Explaining the flight of the bumblebee. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. BookGoogle Scholar
• UN. (2017). The Paris agreement. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en. Accessed 30 Oct 2019.

Further Reading

• Aidt, T. S. (2019). Corruption. In R. Congleton, B. Grofman, & S. Voigt (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public choice (pp. 604–627). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
• Binderkrantz, A. S., & Pedersen, H. H. (2019). The lobbying success of citizen and economic groups in Denmark and the UK. Acta Politica, 54, 75–103. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Fukuyama, F. (2011). The origins of political order. From prehuman times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Google Scholar
• Hardin, G. (1968). Tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1234–1248. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Jensen, M. F. (2018). The building of the Scandinavian states: Establishing Weberian bureaucracy and curbing corruption from the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth century. In H. Byrkjeflot & F. Engelstad (Eds.), Bureaucracy and society in transition: Comparative perspective (Vol. 33, pp. 179–203). Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing Limited. ChapterGoogle Scholar

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

1. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

Corresponding author

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

1. Business Research Institute, University of Chester, Chester, UK Phil Harris
2. Universita della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland Alberto Bitonti
3. Aurora WDC, Madison, WI, USA Craig S. Fleisher
4. Aarhus University, Aarhus C, Denmark Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

Section Editor information

1. Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Anne Binderkrantz Skorkjær

Rights and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this entry

Cite this entry

Svendsen, G.T. (2020). Collective Action Problem. In: Harris, P., Bitonti, A., Fleisher, C., Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13895-0_34-1

Download citation

• .RIS
• .ENW
• .BIB

• DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13895-0_34-1
• Received : 30 January 2020
• Accepted : 24 February 2020
• Published : 09 March 2020
• Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
• Print ISBN : 978-3-030-13895-0
• Online ISBN : 978-3-030-13895-0
• eBook Packages : Springer Reference Political Science and International Studies Reference Module Humanities and Social Sciences Reference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences